THE SYMPOSIUM papers and comments in this volume bring up a number of the important features of the East Asian economy. But the discussion would not be complete without consideration of a few additional points. Most of the following comments are very loosely organized around the theme of industrial policy, or government involvement in the economy.
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Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1996 ket distortions, such as institutionalized corruption and administered prices that deviate widely from market levels.
This issue leads directly to the question of industrial policy. Recent debate about the Asian development experience has had a strong political element. In the late 1980s, Japanese government officials seconded to the World Bank became dissatisfied with the strong emphasis on deregulation, privatization, and getting prices right. Believing that their own government had enhanced domestic growth through directed credit, controlled prices, subsidies to private sector R&D consortiums, tolerance of private sector collusion, legal cartels, and heavy protectionism (on both imports and inward investment), the Japanese were eager to promote their experience as an alternative to Western neoclassical economics. They also believed that the rest of Asia was following the Japanese model and that this explained the region's rapid growth. The Japanese government funded a World Bank study of the Asian development process, resulting in the publication of The East Asian Miracle in 1993. But the Japanese were disappointed with the outcome of the study, which gave only very weak support to their ideas: industrial policy was identified only as a possible factor in Japanese and Korean development and as generally unimportant or undesirable elsewhere. There are legitimate theoretical and empirical issues concerning the role of industrial policy, but keep in mind that much of the debate in the past several years has primarily been a matter of politics and pride; the newly affluent Japan, now the number two funder of the World Bank, has wanted to exercise its voice and its vote to prove to the world that it is a major independent player, with its own paradigm of development to offer.
As a result of their strong desire to believe in a distinctive Japanese model of development and its replication in the rest of Asia, the Japanese have responded to the new growth accounting studies with considerable distress. Collins and Bosworth's paper in this volume lends more support to the notion that the pattern of development in Japan has been somewhat different from that in the rest of Asia. This is not welcome news to those who want to push the notion of Asian distinctiveness. According to the Japanese view, industrial policy is the crucial distinctive ingredient of Japan's high economic growth and rapid total factor productivity increases. If other East Asian countries are implementing similar industrial policies-often financed by large doses of Japanese official development assistance-why is total factor productivity not rising rapidly? Despite the lack of statistical support for the beneficial role of industrial policy, it may be possible to find a positive impact by other means. David Weinstein suggests that Japanese industrial policy has many examples of failure to balance the successes. But this may not be the point. The existence of industrial policy may have lowered the perception of risk, thereby raising expected rates of return on investment and yielding more rapid capital accumulation. In the absence of rapid total factor productivity growth, rapid capital accumulation stands out as unusual in the recent Asian growth experience. By providing a generally favorable environment for business-with some informal or explicit advice on the allocation of investment (allowing banks and manufacturers not to worry about "overinvestment") and toleration of legalized cartel behavior (to bolster firms facing short-term financial constraints in cyclical downturns)-governments have encouraged banks to lend and firms to add capacity. Thus the macroeconomic consequences of industrial policy may be more positive than the evidence on microeconomic mistakes would suggest.
Those microeconomic mistakes are real, as Weinstein points out. Japan has probably allocated excessive resources to favored industries-including steel, shipbuilding, and semiconductors-not to mention pursuing foolish agricultural policies that have resulted in a wildly inefficient sector. However, although such efforts at directed credit, price-fixing, and trade protection may not have been good for the longterm efficiency of the economy, they have had an international impact. Many of the uncertainties in Asia's economic future lie precisely in this realm of political stability. Hong Kong reverts to Chinese ownership in 1997, and the consequences for investor confidence cannot be known. Taiwan faces similar uncertainity for as long as it continues in the strange limbo of a successful economy that is not officially recognized as a nation by much of the world. Suharto has led Indonesia for thirty years, but is now aging in a country without a clear succession process. And no one can predict the political future of post-Deng China. One would like to believe that the existing record of growth and development has been sustained long enough that new political leaders will perceive greater gain in upholding current political and economic regimes than in imposing radical change, but there is no guarantee of such a benign future.
